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Freedom from Detention: The Constitutionality
of Mandatory Detention for Criminal Aliens
Seeking to Challenge Grounds for Removal
By Darlene C. Goring *

I. INTRODUCTION
The systemic dysfunction of our current immigration system
has never been more readily apparent than when examining the
lack of uniformity in mandatory detention and bond
determinations for a limited class of criminal aliens 1 in removal
proceedings. What was envisioned by the constitutional framers
as a uniform national immigration framework has deteriorated
into a jurisprudential quagmire. As a result, it oftentimes
infringes upon the due process protections afforded to aliens
subject to removal 2 from the United States who do not concede
that they are either “deportable” under section 237 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified as 8 U.S.C. §

*

Sam D’Amico Endowed Professor of Law and Nolan J. Edwards Professor of Law,
Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center. The author wishes to thank John
Peacock and Matthew O. Boles for their wonderful research assistance. This article is
dedicated to my inspirational guide, Reverend Franklin R. Clark, Pastor at Mt. Olivette
Baptist Church.
1. The phrase “criminal alien” is used by the author throughout this research project
to refer to a class of aliens convicted of one or more of the enumerated predicate offenses set
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
2. Aliens subject to removal from the United States are governed by the Immigration
and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012). See also United States v. LopezVasquez, 227 F.3d 476, 479 n.2 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Before IIRIRA’s enactment in 1996,
individuals such as Lopez-Vasquez who were ineligible for admission into the United States
and were never admitted into the United States were referred to as ‘excludable’ while aliens
who had gained admission, but later became subject to expulsion from the United States,
were referred to as ‘deportable’ . . . . In addition, the IIRIRA [Illegal Immigration and
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] has ‘done away with the previous legal
distinction among deportation, removal, and exclusion proceedings . . . . Now, the term
‘removal proceedings’ refers to proceedings applicable to both inadmissible and deportable
aliens.”).
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1227, 3 or “inadmissible” under section 212 of the INA, codified
as 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 4
Generally, all aliens who are apprehended by immigration
enforcement agencies within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) 5 are subject to civil detention—due to their
inadmissibility or deportability—until such time as removal
proceedings pursuant to Section 240 of the INA, codified as 8
U.S.C. § 1229(a) 6 are concluded. Detention facilities are secure,
prison-like facilities that are usually located in remote, rural
areas. 7 In recognition of the quasi-criminal nature of the
detention process, section 1226(a) affords aliens an opportunity
to request release from detention upon posting a bond. 8 However,
this practice does not apply to aliens subject to certain statutorily
enumerated criminal convictions.
Section 236(c) of the INA, codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), 9
authorizes apprehension and mandatory detention without an
3. Aliens admitted to the United States are subject to the deportation provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
4. Aliens who seek admission to the United States are subject to the provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012).
5. See generally Our History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV.,
http://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history [https://perma.cc/BBZ6-WC3L] (“On March 1,
2003, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) officially assumed responsibility
for the immigration service functions of the federal government. The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135) dismantled the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) and separated the former agency into three components within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).”). The Homeland Security Act created USCIS
to enhance the security and efficiency of national immigration services by focusing
exclusively on the administration of benefit applications. Id. The law also formed
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to
oversee immigration enforcement and border security. Id; see also Hernandez v. Ashcroft,
345 F.3d 824, 828 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
6. Aliens subject to removal from the United States. For the removal provisions, see
generally Immigration and Nationality Act § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229.
7. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION:
ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
FACILITY
COSTS
AND
STANDARDS
1,
9-10
(2014),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666467.pdf [https://perma.cc/38CJ-78DJ]; Dagmar R.
Myslinska, Living Conditions in Immigration Detention Centers, NOLO,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/living-conditions-immigration-detentioncenters.html [https://perma.cc/XA8V-ZSK7].
8. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c) (2014), 66 Stat. 200). This was originally enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Div. C of Pub. L. 104–208,
110 Stat. 3009-546. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act,
CORNELL
U.
L.
SCH.:
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
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individualized bond hearing of aliens during the pendency of
removal hearings initiated pursuant to INA § 240 who are either
deportable or inadmissible, upon their release from criminal
custody after conviction for a statutorily enumerated list 10 of
predicate crimes set forth in § 1226(c)(1), including aggravated
felonies, 11 crimes involving moral turpitude, 12 and terrorist
activities. 13 As a result, upon release from criminal custody,
aliens who were convicted of the statutorily enumerated predicate
offenses are subject to mandatory detention by the Department of
Homeland Security. Upon release from criminal custody, these
criminal aliens must remain in detention and are not eligible to
post a bond to gain their release. 14 This results in a prolonged
detention 15 of all criminal aliens, including a cohort of criminal
aliens who may successfully challenge efforts to remove them
from the country.
It is an unassailable principle of both immigration and
constitutional law that Congress is authorized to detain aliens who
are subject to removal from the United States because they are
either inadmissible or deportable. In Wong Wing v. United
States, 16 the United States Supreme Court held that
“[p]roceedings to exclude or expel would be in vain if those
accused could not be held in custody pending the inquiry into
their true character, and while arrangements were being made for

https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/illegal_immigration_reform_and_immigration_responsib
ility_act [https://perma.cc/PW3B-VTFW].
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)-(d) (2012).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Supp. 2014).
12. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALIEN REMOVALS AND RETURNS:
OVERVIEW AND TRENDS 4, n.28 (2015) (“Moral turpitude is not defined under immigration
law, and has been determined by case law. In general, if a crime manifests an element of
baseness, vileness, or depravity under current mores—if it evidences an evil or predatory
intent—it involves moral turpitude. For example, crimes such as murder, rape, blackmail,
tax evasion, and fraud have been considered to involve moral turpitude, whereas crimes such
as simple assault, possessing stolen property, and forgery have not. The flexibility in the
term is to allow for changing social norms.”).
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (2012).
14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
15. Prolonged detention is defined as lengthy detention of criminal aliens when
removal proceedings are pending but no order of removal has been issued. AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION: IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT, PROLONGED IMMIGRATION DETENTION
OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE CHALLENGING REMOVAL 1 (2009)
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file766_40474.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MLU9-8LK5].
16. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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their deportation.” 17 The extent of Congressional authority to
detain aliens has expanded since the Court considered this issue
in 1896. Under the current immigration framework governing
detention, Congress mandates the civil detention of aliens
awaiting completion of removal proceedings upon their release
from criminal custody. The United States Supreme Court in
Demore v. Kim 18 held that mandatory “[d]etention during
removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that
process.” 19
However, aliens present in the United States are entitled to
assert due process protections which include a fundamental
liberty interest in being free from unlawful detention that violates
their substantive due process protections. The criminal aliens in
Demore, like many other aliens in similar situations, often
concede that they are subject to removal due to their
inadmissibility or deportability. 20 However, Demore left open the
question of whether mandatory detention is constitutionally
permissible for criminal aliens who want to assert colorable
challenges to their removal. 21 The Seventh Circuit is the only
federal circuit that has provided some guidance as to the
circumstances under which criminal aliens can seek to avoid
mandatory detention without an individualized bond hearing by
asserting a colorable claim that they are not subject to removal.
This article will examine the narrow question left unresolved
by the Court’s decision in Demore regarding “whether mandatory
detention under § 1226(c) is consistent with due process when a
detainee makes a colorable claim that he is not in fact
deportable.” 22 This article will examine the Seventh Circuit’s
application of that language to provide heightened due process
protections to aliens facing mandatory detention. It will also
17. Id. at 235; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (“[T]his Court has
recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the
deportation process.”).
18. 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
19. Id. at 531.
20. News Release, Dep’t of Justice: Exec. Office for Immigration Review,
Immigration Court Process in the U.S. (2005) (2005 WL 3541986) (“In most removal
proceedings, aliens concede that they are removable, but then apply for one or more forms
of relief from removal.”); Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.
21. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (“The INS detention of respondent, a criminal alien who
has conceded that he is deportable, for the limited period of his removal proceedings, is
governed by these cases.”).
22. Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2004).
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examine the application of section 1226(c) to aliens in removal
proceedings and discuss the due process implications arising from
mandatory detention of aliens in removal proceedings.
This article will argue that the current statutory and
jurisprudential framework governing mandatory detention
without bond for criminal aliens who do not concede removability
violates the due process protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment. 23 Finally, it will propose a modification to the
current mandatory detention framework that will offer heightened
protection of the fundamental liberty interests held by criminal
aliens.

II. MANDATORY DETENTION OF CRIMINAL
ALIENS PENDING REMOVAL UNDER SECTION
1226(C)
Criminalization24 of the immigration process makes
mandatory detention without bond necessary to enable the federal
government to effectuate the removal of criminal aliens.
Provisions of the INA are designed to work in tandem to achieve
this congressional goal. However, the combined lack of
uniformity between the federal circuits regarding the
interpretation and application of § 1226(c) has created a
patchwork of immigration policies that conflict with the due
process protections afforded to all persons—including criminal
aliens—present in the United States.
It is important to note that there is not a perfect correlation
between apprehension, detention, and eventual removal of
criminal aliens from the United States. In 1996, Congress
recognized, when debating the purposes underlying the adoption
23. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
24. In response to the perception that crimes committed by aliens were increasing,
Congress enacted several key legislative reforms aimed at expanding the categories of
criminal convictions that would subject aliens to determinations of inadmissibility,
deportability, and ultimate removal from the United States. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009-546 (1996) (codified in titles 8 and 18 of the U.S. Code); Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified
in titles 8, 18, 28, 40, and 42 of the U.S. Code). For a discussion about the legislative history
of § 1226(c), see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003). “Congress adopted this
provision against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of
criminal activity by aliens.” Id.
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of § 1226(c), that there is a small cohort of criminal aliens who
would not be removed despite their eligibility for removal. 25 In
his report to the House of Representatives, Congressman Henry
Hyde discussed the growing number of incarcerated aliens who
were foreign born. Although the number was significant, he
estimated that twenty percent of those incarcerated aliens “are not
deportable because they are either naturalized citizens or lawful
permanent residents with protection from deportation.” 26
Generally, the Attorney General may exercise discretion in
deciding whether to detain an alien during removal proceedings.
Section 1226(a) provides in pertinent part that “an alien may be
arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed from the United States.” 27 That exercise of
discretion is not available for a limited class of aliens who
committed one of the enumerated crimes set forth in Section
1226(c).
Section 1226(c) requires the Department of Homeland
Security to detain without bond any alien released from custody
for commission of an enumerated list of crimes pending
completion of removal proceedings. 28 Predicate offenses or
predicate crimes (A)-(D) that trigger mandatory detention include
crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, controlled
substance offenses, terrorist activities, and firearms offenses. 29
Aliens subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) are
entitled to review of their custody determination by an
immigration judge. 30 In Joseph, 31 the procedures required by this
hearing, which is commonly referred to as a “Joseph hearing,”
were examined. 32 A Joseph hearing affords an alien the
opportunity to challenge the mandatory detention determination
on the basis that the alien was “properly included” 33 within the
25. Demore, 538 U.S. at 520-21.
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 118 (1996).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
30. See Gayle v. Johnson, 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 379-81 (D.N.J. 2015).
31. 22 I. & N. 799 (1999).
32. Id. at 800-06.
33. Id. at 800-02; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(ii) (2016); see also Gayle, 81 F. Supp. 3d
at 381. The criminal aliens in a putative class action challenged “the adequacy of the Joseph
hearing.” Id. at 379. The plaintiffs successfully argued “that Joseph hearings do not satisfy
due process because the burden of proof on aliens during such hearings is unconstitutionally
burdensome.” Id. at 388-89. The court agreed and imposed “a probable cause standard on
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category of criminal aliens subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c). 34 In a Joseph hearing, the alien has an opportunity to
demonstrate that the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (BICE) is “substantially unlikely to establish” that
the alien is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to §
1226(c). 35 In Joseph, the BIA held “that a lawful permanent
resident will not be considered ‘properly included’ in a mandatory
detention category when an Immigration Judge or the Board is
convinced that the Service is substantially unlikely to establish at
the merits hearing, or on appeal, the charge or charges that would
otherwise subject the alien to mandatory detention.” 36 If
the [Immigration Judge’s] initial determination of whether the Government has a sufficient
basis to detain individuals under § 1226(c).” Id. at 398. Because of this ruling, the district
court rejected “[p]laintiff’s proposed standard—a showing that the alien has a substantial
challenge to the Government’s basis for detention under § 1226(c), as opposed to the alien’s
current standard of showing the Government is substantially unlikely to prevail—is
constitutionally required.” Id. The court found that under this structure, “the alien will have
received constitutionally sustainable due process.” Gayle, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 398. The court
denied Plaintiff’s motion to certify class. Id. at 404-05. The parties appealed. See Garfield
Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2016) (“On appeal,
Appellants, joined by numerous amici, challenge the merits of the District Court’s
substantive and procedural due process rulings, as well as its denial of their motion to certify
a class, and the Government has responded point by point. Yet, as the parties conceded at
oral argument in response to inquiry by the Court, Oral Arg. at 17:56, 38:01 (argued Feb. 10,
2016), the District Court did not have authority to reach the merits. Nor do we. The District
Court’s judgment therefore must be vacated and the case remanded for consideration of the
only issue over which it had jurisdiction: the motion for class certification.”).
34. The alien has the burden of proving that the government is “substantially unlikely”
to prevail in proving that § 1226(c) is applicable to the alien. See Casas v. Devane, No. 15cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293598, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2015) (“[A]ny alien may challenge at
an administrative hearing the determination that he is ‘properly included’ in the categories
of aliens subject to mandatory detention under 1226(c). The alien may then appeal the IJ’s
determination as to the applicability of 1226(c) to the BIA. Unlike a removability
determination, the BIA’s review of the applicability 1226(c) is not appealable to a federal
court of appeals.”) (citations omitted).
35. Joseph, 22 I. & N. 799, 806 (1999).
36. Id. In Tijani v. Willis, the concurring opinion clearly set forth criticism of the
Joseph decision by stating:
The BIA’s Joseph decision was, plainly put, wrong. There can be no doubt
that individual liberty is one of the most fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution . . . . Joseph, which was decided prior to Zadvydas, gives that
right little or no weight. Instead, it establishes a system of “detention by
default” by placing the burden fully on the alien to prove that he should not be
detained. When such a fundamental right is at stake, however, the Supreme
Court has insisted on heightened procedural protections to guard against the
erroneous deprivation of that right. In particular, the Supreme Court has time
and again rejected laws that place on the individual the burden of protecting
his or her fundamental rights.
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successful, the alien’s detention is deemed discretionary and the
alien is thereafter entitled to an individualized bond hearing
within the scope of INA § 1226(a). 37 At the individualized bond
hearing, the government has an opportunity to demonstrate that
continued detention is necessary. 38
Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges raised in
the form of habeas petitions 39 against mandatory detention and
bond requests. 40 Section 236(e) bars federal courts from
reviewing challenges to an Immigration Judge’s discretionary
decision regarding bond and detention. However, in federal
court, 41 aliens may assert challenges to “the statutory framework
that permits his detention without bail.” 42
Section 1226(e) bars review of the Attorney General’s
“discretionary judgment,” and an “action or decision by the
Attorney General” regarding detention and/or bond
determinations. 43 However, the Supreme Court in Demore held
that notwithstanding this language, aliens may assert “challenges

430 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring). Judge Tashima expressed
concern that the standard articulated in Joseph did not afford aliens facing mandatory
detention under § 1226(c) a sufficient opportunity to challenge the detention before being
subject to the deprivation of their fundamental liberty interests. Id. at 1244-45. Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Demore was cited to argue that the Joseph analysis should be
narrowly interpreted. Id. at 1246-47. Justice Breyer argued that “[Section 1226(c)] tells the
Attorney General to ‘take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable,’ not one who may,
or may not, fall into that category.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 578 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). However, Judge Tashima argued that “[o]nly those
immigrants who could not raise a ‘substantial’ argument against their removability should
be subject to mandatory detention . . . . This interpretation is not only more respectful of the
Constitution, it is also more consistent with Congress’ chosen language.” Tijani, 430 F.3d
at 1247 (Tashima, J., concurring).
37. Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F. Supp. 2d 759, 766 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
38. Baidas v. Jennings, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1061 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). District courts have the power to grant habeas corpus
relief to aliens where their custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2012).
40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012). “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.” Id.
41. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (“Section 1226(e) contains no explicit
provision barring habeas review, and we think that its clear text does not bar respondent’s
constitutional challenge to the legislation authorizing his detention without bail.”).
42. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e); see also Bugianishvili v. McConnell, No. 1:15-cv-3360,
2015 WL 3903460, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2012).
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to the statutory framework that permits detention without bail.”44
In Demore, the Court concluded, “Section 1226(e) contains no
explicit provision barring habeas review, and we think that its
clear text does not bar respondent’s constitutional challenge to the
legislation authorizing his detention without bail.” 45
The imprecise language of § 1226(c) has resulted in a
growing and conflicting body of jurisprudence regarding the
nature of the mandatory detention obligation that Congress
imposed on immigration officials. 46 A split has emerged in the
federal circuits regarding the interpretation and application of §
1226(c) for mandatory detention without bond for criminal aliens
released from criminal custody.
For example, the First Circuit interprets the language of §
1226(c) as temporal in nature, and holds that § 1226(c) only
requires immigration officials to detain criminal aliens convicted
of a predicate crime, immediately after the criminal alien is
released from custody. 47 Other federal circuits have adopted a
conflicting interpretation. In the Second, Third, Fourth and Tenth
Federal Circuits, § 1226(c) is interpreted as “duty triggering”
language that permits immigration officials to apprehend and
detain a criminal alien “at any time” after the alien was released
from criminal custody. 48 In addition, federal circuits are also in
conflict regarding whether prolonged detention of criminal aliens
subject to mandatory detention without bond may run afoul of the

44. Demore, 538 U.S. at 517; Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir.
2004).
45. Demore, 538 U.S. at 517; Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1014.
46. Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tashima, J., concurring)
(“As with most statutes, the relatively simple mandate of § 236(c) leaves many questions
unanswered, the most important of which is who, exactly, falls under the statute’s provisions.
The statute states only that mandatory detention applies to an alien who ‘is deportable by
reason of having committed’ a number of specified criminal offenses, but does not define
those offenses with precision, nor does it define what ‘is deportable’ means.”).
47. See Castaneda v. Souza, 810 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2015) (“[W]e conclude that the
‘when . . . released’ clause imposes a deadline for picking up an alien coming out of criminal
custody that limits the application of (c)(2)’s bar to bonded release.”); Id. at 39.
48. See Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 611 (2d Cir. 2015); Sylvain v. Att’y Gen.,
714 F.3d 150, 156-57 (3d Cir. 2013); Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 384 (4th Cir. 2012);
Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1327 (10th Cir. 2015). These federal circuits deferred to
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) ruling that “‘when. . . released’ does not impose a
temporal restriction on the agency’s authority and duty to detain an alien.” Lora, 804 F.3d
at 610 (citing Rojas, 23 I. & N. 117, 120-21, 127 (2001).
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Due Process Clause. 49 The Supreme Court has not weighed in to
resolve these issues. 50

III. DEMORE V. KIM
Non-punitive civil detentions 51 are generally not
constitutionally permissible except during times of “global war or
domestic insurrection” 52 as illustrated by the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II. 53 However, within the
field of immigration, civil detention of aliens is permissible, and
does not infringe upon the protection afforded to aliens under the
Due Process Clause. 54 Congress’s power to detain aliens is a
longstanding principle of immigration law. In Wong Wing v.
United States, 55 the Supreme Court acknowledged that detention
is an integral component of the admission and removal process
within the immigration field:
We think it clear that detention, or temporary
confinement, as part of the means necessary to give
effect to the provisions for the exclusion or expulsion
of aliens would be valid. Proceedings to exclude or
expel would be in vain if those accused could not be
held in custody pending the inquiry into their true
character and while arrangements were being made for
49. A number of federal circuits (including the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits)
adopted the analysis introduced by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in Demore.
Justice Kennedy argued that mandatory detention without bond subject to § 1226(c) could
infringe upon an alien’s liberty interest where such “continued detention became
unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In such circumstances, continued detention would be appropriate only upon a
showing by the government that the alien was a “risk of flight or dangerous[].” Id. at 53233. In the absence of either circumstance, an alien who had been unreasonably or
unjustifiably detained for a prolonged time period would thereafter fall within the parameters
of § 1226(a) and be entitled to an individualized bond determination. The Second Circuit
rejected the “fact-dependent inquiry” in favor of a bright-line rule that a “six-month period”
of detention is presumptively reasonable. See Lora, 804 F.3d at 614-15.
50. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the conflicting interpretation and
application of § 1226(c), see Gerard Savaresse, Note, When is When?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
and the Requirements of Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285 (2013).
51. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (defining non-punitive
civil detentions as detentions that are “merely preventative”).
52. Id. at 1074.
53. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-17, 223 (1944).
54. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well established that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”).
55. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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their deportation. Detention is a usual feature in every
case of arrest on a criminal charge, even when an
innocent person is wrongfully accused; but it is not
imprisonment in a legal sense. 56
The question remaining after Wong Wing was the extent of
Congress’s power to detain. In Demore v. Kim, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of civil detentions by
immigration officials and held that “[d]etention during removal
proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that
process.” 57 Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court held
that, “Congress, justifiably concerned that deportable criminal
aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail
to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may
require that persons such as respondent be detained for the brief
period necessary for their removal proceedings.” 58
The criminal alien in Demore, a South Korean citizen, was a
lawful permanent resident of the United States. 59 Mr. Kim was
convicted of burglary and petty theft, and charged with being
deportable for those crimes. 60 The INS and the Court adopted the
position that Mr. Kim conceded that he was deportable and
consequently, proceeded with their analyses on that basis. 61
There appeared to be a disputed question regarding whether
Mr. Kim conceded deportability, and in doing so “forwent a
hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any
nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not
56. Id. at 235.
57. Demore v. Kim, 583 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). “At the same time, however, this Court
has recognized detention during deportation proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of
the deportation process.” Id. at 523.
58. Id. at 513.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (“Respondent also did not dispute that INS’ conclusion
that he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c) . . . . In conceding that he was
deportable, respondent forwent a hearing at which he would have been entitled to raise any
nonfrivolous argument available to demonstrate that he was not properly included in a
mandatory detention category.”). However, the varying opinion of the Court stated, “At the
outset, there is the Court’s mistaken suggestion that Kim ‘conceded’ his removability . . . .
The Court cites no statement before any court about conceding removability, and I can find
none.” Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See id. at 577 (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“This case, however, is not one in which an
alien concedes deportability. As Justice Souter pointed out, Kim argues to the contrary . . .
. Kim claims that his earlier convictions were neither for an ‘aggravated felony’ nor for two
crimes of ‘moral turpitude.’”).
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properly included in a mandatory detention category.” 62
However, a Joseph hearing would not have assisted Mr. Kim. The
Joseph hearing would have permitted him to address the question
of whether “his criminal convictions are not for removable
offenses.” 63
However, Mr. Kim also challenged the
government’s ultimate ability to remove him from the country. 64
Mr. Kim asserted that, notwithstanding his criminal convictions,
he was “independently eligible for statutory relief from
removal.” 65 Kim argued on appeal that his prior crimes did not
constitute aggravated felonies or crimes involving moral
turpitude. 66 Had Mr. Kim been successful, he would not have
been subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and would
have been eligible for an individualized bond hearing under §
1226(a) to determine if he was entitled to post bond.
The Supreme Court held that its decision was based on the
fact that he “conced[ed] that he is deportable” in his habeas
petition. 67 The Court did note, however, that Mr. Kim “did not
concede that he will ultimately be deported. As the dissent notes,
respondent has applied for withholding of removal.” 68 The
parameters of a Joseph hearing are not broad enough to include
an evaluation of removability. 69 In the event that Mr. Kim’s
arrests fell within the categories of predicate crimes enumerated
in § 1226(c), he still would have been subject to mandatory
detention. The fact that Mr. Kim may have been eligible for
withholding of removal was irrelevant to the Immigration Judge
evaluating his case, and would not have prevented immigration
officials from subjecting him to mandatory detention without an
individualized bond hearing. 70
62. Id. at 514. “Nor did he argue that he himself was not ‘deportable’ within the
meaning of § 1226(c).” Id. at 522.
63. Demore, 538 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Supreme Court did not address these arguments because Kim asserted them for the first
time on appeal. See id. at 522 n.6.
64. Id. at 541-42 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 522 n.6.
67. Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 n.6.
68. Id. at 522-23 n.6.
69. Id. at 514 n.3 (“At the hearing, the detainee may avoid mandatory detention by
demonstrating that he is not an alien, was not convicted of the predicate crime, or that the
INS is otherwise substantially unlikely to establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory
detention.”).
70. Id. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The suggestion
that Kim should have contested his removability in this habeas corpus petition . . . misses the
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In Demore, the Court examined the legislative history of §
1226(c) to determine whether mandatory detention was
constitutionally permissible. 71 The legislative history revealed
that the purpose of such detentions was two-fold: first, to reduce
the risk of flight; second, to minimize the danger to the public
from criminal aliens. 72
In Demore, the Supreme Court
determined that a limited period of detention was constitutionally
permissible because it was reasonably related to the limited
purpose of “preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing
prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the
chance that, if ordered removed, the aliens will be successfully
removed.” 73 Although the Court did not impose a specific time

point that all he claims, or could now claim, is that his detention pending removal
proceedings violates the Constitution. Challenges to removability itself, and applications for
relief from removal, are usually submitted in the first instance to an immigration judge . . . .
The Immigration Judge had not yet held an initial hearing on the substantive issue of
removability when Kim filed his habeas petition in the District Court, even though Kim had
been detained for over three months under § 1226(c). If Kim’s habeas corpus petition had
claimed ‘that he himself was not “deportable,”’ as the Court suggests it should have . . . the
District Court would probably have dismissed the claim as unexhausted.”).
71. Id. at 514-16.
72. Demore, 538 U.S. at 515. However, in Gayle v. Johnson, the court noted the
following:
While it appears that the primary basis for mandatory detention was
congressional concern over the possibility that potentially deportable aliens
who were not detained would fail to appear for their removal proceedings,
frustrating the Government’s removal efforts, . . . nevertheless, the reports and
data relied on by Congress in enacting § 1226(c), and by the Supreme Court in
upholding the constitutionality of the law, have been heavily criticized by
several scholarly commentators as inaccurate and misleading. Scholars
question whether there was in fact a significant percentage of removable aliens
who actually appeared before an Immigration Judge for a bond hearing that
then failed to return for their remaining proceedings.
4 F. Supp. 3d 692, 709-10 n.25 (D.N.J. 2014).
73. Id. at 528. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, held that detention
is permissible for post-removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which allows immigration officials
to detain without bond following an order of removal. 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). The Court
did, however, impose a temporal limit on the length of post-removal detention without bond:
Consequently, for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts, we
recognize that period. After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as
the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the
“reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 6month presumption, of course, does not mean that every alien not removed
must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be held in
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period for the detention, the Court did instruct that the detention
should be for a brief period of time. 74
It is important to note that the duration of pre-removal
immigration detention for extended periods of time can trigger
due process concerns. Justice Kennedy authored a concurring
opinion in Demore in which he addressed the length of preremoval detentions. He argued that “since the Due Process
Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful
permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to
an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and
dangerousness if the continued detention became unreasonable or
unjustified.” 75 Such extended periods of detention may run afoul
of the Due Process Clause unless immigration officials can
demonstrate that the continued detention is necessary because the
alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. 76 The
constitutionality of prolonged detention is of little significance to
a criminal alien who immigration officials cannot ultimately
remove from the country. Prolonged detention for criminal aliens
who do not concede removability are not permitted to assert a
challenge to their ultimate removability before they are detained
without the opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. This
type of detention serves only one purpose; to further penalize
criminal aliens after their release from criminal custody. This is
not a constitutionally permissible reason for subjecting aliens to
civil detention. For this cohort of criminal aliens, mandatory
detention without bond infringes upon the substantive due process
protections afforded by the Constitution to be free from
unreasonable restraint.

IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS APPLYING
DEMORE

confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Id. at 701.
74. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 598, 513 (2003) (“We hold that Congress, justifiably
concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime
and fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such
as respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”).
75. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
76. Id.
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For nearly twenty years, courts within the Seventh Circuit
have consistently held that the mandatory detention statute “is
unconstitutional as applied to prisoners who have a good-faith
claim that they will ultimately be permitted to remain in the
country.” 77 In addition to Seventh Circuit precedent, 78 in Justice
77. See Forbes v. Perryman, 244 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2003). In Forbes, a
lawful permanent resident from Jamaica lived in the United States since 1967. Id. at 948.
Forbes was detained since June 10, 2002, to at least when the order was issued February 14,
2003. Id. at 947-48. He was detained in 2002 for a 1995 conviction for “unlawful delivery
of cannabis,” which was found subject to mandatory detention under § 236(c). Id. Forbes
presented “a good-faith defense to removal.” Id. at 949.
Mr. Forbes was erroneously denied the opportunity to file for relief under §
212(c) of the [INA] as allowed by INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 329 [] (2001)
(holding that provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 repealing discretionary relief form removal do not
apply retroactively to aliens who pleaded guilty to possession of controlled
substances prior to the enactment of the statute).
Forbes, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 949. The court held that “Mr. Forbes is entitled to an
individualized bond hearing, and [] order[ed] the [INS] to provide him with such a hearing
within two weeks.” Id. at 950. In Patel v. Ridge, the court stated that “[s]everal judges of
this court have held that [S]ection 1226(c) is unconstitutional as applied to detainees who
have a ‘good-faith claim’ that they will ultimately be permitted to remain in the country.”
No. 04 C 2109, 2004 WL 1595362, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2004). In Patel, a lawful
permanent resident, convicted of “the offense of False Declarations before a Grand Jury,”
was charged with removability “as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.” Id. The
alien asserted that “he [had] a ‘good-faith claim’ that he [was] not deportable, and, therefore,
that detention pursuant to section 1226(c) [was] unconstitutional as applied to him.” Id. at
*2. The District Court rejected Patel’s argument as “conclusory,” and determined that he
“neither cited, quoted, nor developed any argument regarding this precedent and statutory
law.” Id. In Bonsol v. Perryman, the court found that the criminal alien did not concede
removability and “raise[d] a good-faith challenge to his removal based on his assertion that
he was not ‘convicted’ under Illinois law.” 240 F. Supp. 2d 823, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The
district court found a Fifth Amendment violation because as applied, § 1226(c) “is not
narrowly tailored because it adopts a categorical approach to detention based only on the
criterion of lack of United States citizenship.” Id. at 827.
78. To a very limited extent, other jurisdictions are considering whether mandatory
detention without bond under § 1226(c) infringes upon the fundamental liberty interests of
criminal aliens who do not concede removability. See Ramirez-Garcia v. Holder, 550 F.
App’x 501, 502 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit vacated a Removal Order for an alien
who asserted derivative United States citizenship through his mother pursuant to § 201(g) of
the INA. See In re Ramirez-Garcia, A12 519 653, 2007 WL 2463883, at *1 (BIA July 24,
2007). Ramirez-Garcia was convicted and sentenced to sixty-months imprisonment in 1988
for trafficking in controlled substances. Id. at *3. An Order of Removal was entered on the
basis of that conviction. Id. at *1. Upon release for criminal custody, Ramirez-Garcia was
placed in mandatory detention under § 1226(c). Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012). In
Gayle v. Johnson, an alien convicted of the predicate crimes that made him subject to
mandatory detention, was held without bond under § 1226(c), but was ultimately not found
removable. 81 F. Supp. 3d 371, 374-75 (D.N.J. 2015). Thus, his detention served no purpose
and did not further the government’s underlying purpose of § 1226(c). See 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c). One of the named plaintiffs in the putative class action, Sukh, a Guyanese national,
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Souter’s concurrence in Demore, he observed that “[s]ome
individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious
challenges to removability or claims for relief from removal. As
to such aliens . . . the Government has only a weak reason under
the immigration laws for detaining them.” 79
For example, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Demore, the Seventh Circuit in Parra v. Perryman 80
hypothesized the possible scenario where “it is easy to imagine”81
that an alien could raise a constitutional challenge to mandatory
detention if the alien had a good faith basis for challenging his
removal. 82 In Parra, the alien was not successful in this regard,
but the Court acknowledged the possibility that such a challenge
could be asserted. 83 Mr. Parra, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted
of “aggravated criminal sexual assault” in 1996 and was found to
be removable for conviction of an aggravated felony. 84 He was
apprehended and detained without the possibility of posting a
bond. 85
The alien did not present any good faith reasons—such as
that he was a United States citizen—that could be used to
challenge removal, and in fact, the court noted that the case did
not fall within any of the examples noted because “Parra concedes
that he is an alien removable because of his criminal conviction,
and Mexico accepts return of its citizens.” 86 The Seventh Circuit
and lawful permanent resident for twenty years, was detained for “nearly 21 months” in a
correctional facility. Gayle, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 377. He was deemed deportable due to
convictions for assault and theft of services, which are crimes of moral turpitude. Id. After
almost two years, the “[Immigration Judge] granted Sukhu’s application for the adjustment
of status based on a relative petition filed by his U.S. citizen daughter, and thus, terminated
his removal proceedings” and released him from immigration custody. Id. at 378.
79. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 561 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
80. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 957.
82. Id. The court in Parra stated the following:
Section 1226(c) authorizes detention by the Executive Branch without trial,
and it is easy to imagine cases—for example, claims to persons detained under
§ 1226(c) who say that they are citizens rather than aliens, who contend that
they have not been convicted of one of the felonies that authorizes removal, or
who are detained indefinitely because the nations of which they are citizens
will not take them back—in which resort to the Great Writ may be appropriate.
Id. at 957.
83. Id.
84. Parra, 172 F.3d at 955.
85. Id. at 956.
86. Id. at 957.
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adopted the narrow position that Parra did not have any due
process interests worthy of constitutional protection. 87 The Court
noted that “[t]he private interest here is not liberty in the abstract,
but liberty in the United States by someone no longer entitled to
remain in this country . . . the probability of error is zero when the
alien concedes all elements that require removal (as Parra has
done).” 88 As a result, possible violations of fundamental liberty
interests were not considered because criminal aliens “subject to
§ 1226(c) have forfeited any legal entitlement to remain in the
United States.” 89
In Vang v. Ashcroft, 90 a case also decided prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Demore, a District Court in the
Seventh Circuit found that mandatory detention under § 1226(c)
“as applied to petitioners who have not conceded removability”
infringed upon the alien’s substantive liberty interests. 91 In Vang,
the District Court distinguished the Parra decision for criminal
aliens, who unlike Parra, “all demonstrated at least some hope that
they will not be removed.” 92 The Vang decision examined
conflicting federal district decisions that considered “the
constitutionality of § 1226(c) as applied to petitioners who have
not conceded removability,” 93 and concluded that “§ 1226(c)
implicates a fundamental liberty interest as applied.” 94
The District Court applied the heightened scrutiny analysis
test set forth in United States v. Salerno 95 to evaluate the alien’s
substantive due process claims. 96 Salerno held that “the
government may not infringe a person’s fundamental liberty
interests, regardless of the process provided, unless it narrowly
tailors the infringement to serve a compelling state interest.” 97
Vang held that the government’s stated regulatory goals for
mandatory detention, which included providing for public safety
87. Id. at 958.
88. Id. (italics omitted).
89. Parra, 172 F.3d at 958 (italics omitted).
90. Vang v. Ashcroft, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
91. Id. at 1035.
92. Id. at 1038. The court stated, “Where, as here, there is a good faith basis to contest
removability, however, the Court does not believe Parra precludes a bond hearing.” Id. at
1036.
93. Id. at 1035.
94. Id. at 1037.
95. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
96. Id. at 739.
97. Vang, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748).
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and insuring the criminal alien’s participation in removal
proceedings, were legitimate. 98 However, the court held that
“while legitimate, the goals outlined by Congress do not justify
the infringement of [criminal aliens’] fundamental rights.” 99
Section 1226(c), as applied to criminal aliens who have good faith
challenges to their removal, was not narrowly tailored because it
“sweeps too broadly” by denying bond hearings to all aliens,
including those who “demonstrated at least some hope that they
will not be removed.” 100
The Seventh Circuit also considered this issue after the
Supreme Court’s decision in Demore.
In Gonzalez v.
O’Connell, 101 a lawful permanent resident was “found guilty” of
possession of cocaine and sentenced to two years probation.102
The government found him removable “as an alien convicted of
an aggravated felony,” and detained him subject to § 1226(c). 103
He received a Joseph hearing where “[t]he [immigration judge]
determined that [he] was subject to mandatory detention pending
removal proceedings under § 1226(c) because he was removable
as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and of a state drug
offense. Therefore bond was not available to [him].” 104
Mr. Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 105
He asserted that “his right to due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments” was violated “because he raised the
good-faith argument that he would not in fact be deported.” 106 He
asserted that under Illinois law, his “probationary dispositions”
were not convictions, and thus he was not deportable “because he
was not ‘convicted’ of either an aggravated felony, or a state law
relating to a controlled substance.” 107 At the Joseph hearing, Mr.
Gonzalez was given an opportunity to present evidence that he
was not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). 108

98. Vang, 149 F. Supp. 2d at 1037.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1038.
101. Gonzalez v. O’Connell, 355 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2004).
102. Id. at 1012.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1012.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1013 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 514 n.3 (2003)) (“At the
hearing, the detainee may avoid mandatory detention by demonstrating that he is not an alien,
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The most important aspect of this decision was that Mr.
Gonzalez “did not concede his deportability.” 109 Although Mr.
Gonzalez attempted to distinguish the holding in Demore, the
Seventh Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Demore was equally applicable to his challenge. 110 Although Mr.
Gonzalez challenged his deportability, the Seventh Circuit had
previously ruled that his argument was without merit. 111 The
court noted that “[prior decisions], in effect, stripped Mr.
Gonzalez of the predicate argument underlying his constitutional
claim – that he has raised a ‘good-faith challenge’ to his
deportability.” 112 The Seventh Circuit reconciled Demore with
Gonzalez by noting that “[a] distinction between petitioners who
raise facially meritless claims and those who concede their
deportability is one of form and not substance. Both are without
a legal right to remain in the United States.” 113
The analysis is quite different, however, if an alien has a
good faith challenge to the DHS’s initial determination of
removability. Drawing guidance from Demore, the Seventh
Circuit identified an important gap in the current due process
paradigm governing mandatory detention proceedings. 114 The
Seventh Circuit, drawing from Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion
in Demore, acknowledged that the outcome of Gonzalez’s
challenge would be different if he had asserted a good faith

was not convicted of the predicate crime, or that the INS is otherwise substantially unlikely
to establish that he is in fact subject to mandatory detention.”).
109. Id. at 1014.
110. Id. at 1014-15.
111. Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1020. The Seventh Circuit explained:
It is not necessary, however, for this court to reach this important issue in this
case. After the district court’s decision in this case, this court decided Gill v.
Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2003). Gill squarely rejected the argument
that Mr. Gonzalez advanced before the district court that he was not in fact
“deportable”: that “convict[ion]” for immigration purposes is defined by state
law, and that he was not “convicted” according to Illinois law because he only
received a disposition of probation.
Id.
112. Id. at 1020. The Seventh Circuit jurisprudence determined that a “‘conviction’
for immigration purposes is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), and that a probationary
disposition under 720 ILCS 570/410 following a plea of guilty qualifies as a ‘conviction’
under that definition.” Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1012.
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challenge to his removability. 115 The court clearly recognized
that “[a] wholly different case arises when a detainee who has a
good-faith challenge to his deportability is mandatorily detained
under § 1226(c).” 116 Although dicta, this analysis paved the way
for aliens detained subject to § 1226(c) to assert constitutional
challenges to the DHS’s mandatory detention paradigm.
Two more recent District Court decisions arising from the
Seventh Circuit have affirmatively carved out an exception for
aliens who do not concede removability. In Papazoglou v.
Napolitano,117 the alien, a long-term lawful permanent resident,
filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking release from mandatory
detention. 118 The DHS determined that he was subject to removal
because he pled guilty and was convicted of third degree sexual
assault and physical abuse of a child, not as an aggravated
felon. 119 The immigration judge (IJ) found him eligible for full
relief from removal due to a petition filed for adjustment of status,
an application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility, and an I130 visa petition120 filed by his wife, a United States citizen. 121
Mr. Papazoglou was taken into custody and held without bond
pursuant to § 1226(c) for thirteen months. 122 Mr. Papazoglou
argued that his mandatory detention without bond subject to §
1226(c) was unconstitutional. 123 The District Court looked to the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Parra for guidance. 124 The court
concluded that “[t]he Parra decision left the door open to claims
made by detainees who had not yet conceded deportability, but
instead had colorable claims that they were not in fact
deportable.” 125

115. Id. at 1020-21. The court cited Justice Souter’s opinion in Demore v. Kim stating,
“Some individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious challenges to removability
or claims for relief from removal . . . . As to such aliens . . . the Government has only a weak
reason under the immigration laws for detaining them.” 538 U.S. 510, 561 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Gonzalez, 355 F.3d at 1020.
117. Papazoglou v. Napolitano, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778 (N.D. Ill. May
3, 2012).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(I) (2012).
120. Papazoglou, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id. at *2.
125. Papazoglou, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *4.
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Citing Parra, the court found that “questions of due process
violations” are raised when “aliens who claim they are citizens”;
“aliens who claim they have not been convicted of the offenses
that trigger removal”; and “aliens who have no country to which
they can be removed” are subject to mandatory detention without
bond. 126 Mr. Papazoglou argued “that his mandatory detention
without bail [was] unconstitutional because he [had] a colorable,
good faith claim that he [was] not deportable—namely that an IJ
ha[d] already determined that he [was] eligible to remain in the
United States.” 127 The Seventh Circuit in Parra noted that habeas
corpus petitions may be appropriate for aliens subject to
mandatory detention without bond in circumstances where the
alien has not conceded removability. 128
The court found that the Government “infringed upon the
detainee’s fundamental liberty interests” because the alien
“demonstrated a legitimate and good faith reason to contest his
126. Id.
127. Id.; Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Today’s case presents
none of these possibilities, however, for Parra concedes that he is an alien removable because
of his criminal conviction, and Mexico accepts returns of its citizens.”); see also Vang v.
Ashcroft, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
128. Parra, 172 F.3d at 957 (“[R]esort[ing] to the Great Writ may be appropriate.”).
However, in Young v. Aviles, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica was subject to
mandatory detention without a bond hearing after immigration officials determined that he
was subject to removal. 99 F. Supp. 3d 443, 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Young pled guilty
to “possession of approximately twenty pounds of marijuana” with “intent to distribute a
controlled substance.” Id. at 445. Young “was sentenced to ninety days in jail, with credit
for time served.” Id. At the time the District Court issued its opinion, Young had been
detained without bond for “almost seven months,” which was four months longer than the
length of incarceration for the underlying conviction. Id. at 454.
Young filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting several arguments to
distinguish his action from the controlling force of the Demore decision by arguing that “he
[had] a ‘substantial challenge’ to removability . . . .”
Id. at 452.
Young had
contemporaneously “filed applications for Cancellation of Removal and asylum.” Young,
99 F. Supp. 3d at 446. The Court found the argument that “his detention violates the Due
Process Clause” to be “meritless.” Id. at 453. The Court concluded “that Young’s continued
detention without a bond hearing [did] not yet violate due process.” Id. at 456. The Court
explained further:
With respect to the former, an application for cancellation of removal is not a
challenge to removability, but rather a request for discretionary relief . . . .
Unfortunately for Young, “the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore all but
forecloses the argument that ‘the term “is deportable,” as used in § 1226(c),
means anything other than an alien who prima facie qualifies for removal,’
regardless of whatever forms of discretionary relief may be available, as well
as the argument that applying the mandatory detention statute to an alien who
may qualify for discretionary relief is unconstitutional.”
Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
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removability, namely that an IJ ha[d] already determined that
Papazoglou merits full relief from removal.” 129 As a result, the
Court ordered an individualized bond hearing for the alien. 130
The most recent case to consider this issue is Casas v.
Devane. 131 In this case, the criminal alien was convicted of an
aggravated felony and charged by the DHS with being
removable. 132 The criminal alien was apprehended and detained
for four months as an alien subject to mandatory detention
without bond under § 1226(c). 133
He challenged the
constitutional permissibility of his mandatory detention. 134 He
argued that the Seventh Circuit permits aliens to challenge
mandatory detention where there is a good faith challenge to their
removability. 135
The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Demore concluded that mandatory detention of deportable
aliens pending removal is constitutionally permissible, but it
distinguished the holding in Demore from the applicability in
Casas, noting that Demore applies “to aliens who proffer ‘facially
meritless’ bases for contesting their removal . . . .” 136 Instead, the
Court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez, noting
that “a wholly different case arises when a detainee who has a
good faith challenge to his deportability is mandatorily detained
under § 1226(c).” 137 As to Casas, the court concluded that
“Casas’ good-faith basis for challenging his removal
distinguishes him from aliens who by conceding their
deportability have ‘forfeited any legal entitlement to remain in the
United States.’” 138
Casas sought to challenge his deportability on the basis that
“his criminal defense attorney affirmatively misinformed him that
pleading guilty to the charged offense would not subject him to
129. Papazoglou, No. 1:12-cv-00892, 2012 WL 1570778, at *4-5.
130. Id. at *6.
131. Casas v. Devane, No. 15-cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293598 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2015).
132. Id. at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id. “Casas’ [sic] argues that his detention without an individualized bond hearing
is unconstitutional because he has a good-faith basis for contesting his removal.” Id. at *2.
135. Casas, No. 15-cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293595, at *2. The government “concede[d]
that the Seventh Circuit has ‘left open the possibility that an alien [with a] legitimate
challenge to removability might not be subject to mandatory detention.’” Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *3.
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deportation.” 139 Upon concluding that Casas presented a good
faith challenge to his deportability, the Court ordered his release
from mandatory detention “unless he receives an order from an
Immigration Judge who has determined after an individualized
bond hearing that Casas’ continued detention is necessary to
prevent a risk of flight or a threat to public safety.” 140 The Court
concluded that offering Casas an opportunity to challenge his
detention in an individualized bond hearing would not “thwart”
the Congressional purpose underlying the mandatory detention
statute for aliens “who have a good-faith basis for believing they
may ultimately be permitted to remain in the country.” 141

V. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
The field of Immigration law differs significantly from other
areas of law regulated by the federal government. 142 “Congress
traditionally exercises authority over matters of immigration and
exclusion through passage of immigration legislation.” 143 Article
I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to
“establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.” 144 In Fiallo v.
Bell, 145 the Supreme Court reasserted the principle that “‘over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.” 146 Although
the Supreme Court recognizes Congress’s plenary power to
regulate the field of immigration, that power is not without
constitutional safeguards. In INS v. Chadha, 147 the Court limited

139. Casas v. Devane, No. 15-cv-8112, 2015 WL 7293598, at *3. “[T]he Seventh
Circuit has affirmed that modification of a criminal conviction . . . can save an alien from
deportation.” Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See generally Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1465 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Although
the Constitution fails to delegate specifically the power over immigration, the Supreme Court
recognized almost a century ago that the political branches have plenary authority over
immigration matters as an inherent concomitant of national sovereignty.”).
143. Id. at 1466; see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898)
(“The power, granted to Congress by the Constitution, ‘to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization,’ was long ago adjudged by this court to be vested exclusively in Congress.”).
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
145. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
146. Id. at 792.
147. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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the scope of Congressional authority to “constitutionally
permissible means of implementing its power.” 148
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantee of due process protection “applies to all ‘persons’
within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 149 Supreme
Court jurisprudence acknowledged, in decisions dating back to
the 1886 decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 150 that all aliens present
in the United States are persons entitled to assert both
substantive 151 and procedural 152 due process protections against
governmental action. 153 However, Congress is not required to
provide aliens with the full bundle of constitutional rights
afforded to United States citizens. The Supreme Court, in
Mathews v. Diaz, 154 acknowledged and approved of the
constitutional dichotomy that distinguishes aliens from citizens
by noting that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over

148. Id. at 941.
149. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). In Demore v. Kim, Justice Souter
asserted the following:
It has been settled for over a century that all aliens within our territory are
“persons” entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause. Aliens
“residing in the United States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long
as they are permitted by the government of the United States to remain in the
country, to the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the protection of the laws,
in regard to their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and criminal
responsibility.” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1893), settled any
lingering doubt that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause gives aliens a
right to challenge mistreatment of their person or property.
538 U.S. 510, 543 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
150. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886).
151. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (“So-called ‘substantive due
process’ prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the conscience,’ or
interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (citation omitted).
152. Id. “When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property
survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. This
requirement has traditionally been referred to as ‘procedural’ due process.” Id. (citation
omitted). “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment . . . . The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
153. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
238 (1896).
154. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
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naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” 155
The Supreme Court, in Reno v. Flores, 156 examined the
scope to the substantive due process rights afforded by the
Constitution.157 Citing its decision in Foucha v. Louisiana,158
Justice O’Connor noted that “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause from arbitrary governmental action.” 159 The “liberty”
interest protected by the Fifth Amendment “denotes . . . freedom
from bodily restraint . . . .” 160 These longstanding due process
protections are equally afforded to aliens during pending of
removal proceedings. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel
Mezei, 161 the Court held that “aliens who have once passed
through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness
encompassed in due process of law.” 162
In Demore, the Supreme Court held that the detention of a
criminal alien pursuant to § 1226(c) does not infringe upon the
alien’s due process rights granted by the Fifth Amendment.163
The Court expressed the “longstanding view that the Government
155. Id. at 79-80. “Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary,
or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection.” Id. at 77.
156. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
157. Id. at 301-03.
158. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
159. Reno, 507 U.S. at 315 (O’ Connor, J., concurring); see also Forbes v. Perryman,
244 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The government may not interfere with the
fundamental liberty interests of an individual, such as his interest in physical freedom, unless
its actions are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.”) (citing Reno, 507 U.S.
at 301-03); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause . . . provides heightened protection against governmental interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests.”).
160. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Reno, 507 U.S. at 316
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s
affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—which is the
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protection of the Due Process Clause . . .”) (quoting
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
161. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
162. Id. at 212; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional
protection.”).
163. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003); see also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d
228, 239 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The due process afforded aliens stems from those statutory rights
granted by Congress and the principle that ‘minimum due process rights attach to statutory
rights.’”).

936

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:911

may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited
period necessary for their removal proceedings.” 164 However,
while there are no legitimate procedural due process concerns for
criminal aliens who concede removability, the same is not true for
criminal aliens who assert good faith challenges to the
government’s ability to remove them from the country. 165 As to
this cohort of criminal aliens, the Due Process Clause affords
protection against infringement of their substantive liberty
interests. 166
This proposition is consistent with the Court’s longstanding
jurisprudential framework. First, unlike criminal aliens who
concede that they are subject to removal, criminal aliens who
assert good faith challenges to their ultimate removal, retain their
right to remain in the country, and equally important, also retain
their substantive liberty interest to be free from unreasonable civil
detention. 167
Second, no “sufficiently compelling governmental
interest[]” 168 can be furthered from enforcing mandatory
detention without bond pursuant to § 1226(c) for criminal aliens
who can assert good faith challenges to their removal. The
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salerno 169 offers
guidance in this area. In Salerno, the Court balanced the
“individual’s strong interest in liberty” against “the
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety . . . .” 170

164. Demore, 538 U.S. at 526; see also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952)
(“Detention is necessarily a part of this deportation procedure. Otherwise aliens arrested for
deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency of
deportation proceedings.”).
165. Demore, 538 U.S. at 561. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]he fact that a statute serves its purpose in general fails to justify the detention of an
individual in particular. Some individual aliens covered by § 1226(c) have meritorious
challenges to removability or claims for relief from removal . . . . As to such aliens . . . the
Government has only a weak reason under the immigration laws for detaining them.”).
166. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”).
167. Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The private interest here
is not liberty in the abstract, but liberty in the United States by someone no longer entitled to
remain in this country . . . . [T]he probability of error is zero when the alien concedes all
elements that require removal.”).
168. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987).
169. Id. at 747.
170. Id. at 748-50. “On the other side of the scale, of course is the individual’s strong
interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right.
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The Court held that an individual’s liberty interests can be
outweighed in circumstances where “sufficiently compelling
governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous
persons.” 171 Under those circumstances, the Court determined
that “we have found no absolute constitutional barrier to detention
of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation
proceedings.” 172 However, when examining mandatory detention
without bond under § 1226(c) for criminal aliens who do not
concede removal, the scale does not balance in favor of
subordinating their fundamental liberty interest.
Demore was clear that the government’s articulated
rationales underlying § 1226(c) to reduce the risk of flight and to
minimize the danger to the public safety were sufficiently
compelling interests that warrant restrictions to the personal
liberty of criminal aliens. However, mandatory detention without
bond for this limited class of aliens does not further the stated
governmental interest of preventing flight risks and protecting
public safety. Criminal aliens who can assert good faith
challenges to removal are not flight risks. On the contrary, these
aliens have every incentive to participate vigorously in their
removal proceedings in order to successfully defend and resolve
against governmental efforts to remove them from the country.
Additionally, there is no reasonable basis upon which to
categorically conclude that this limited class of aliens poses a
significant threat to public safety. Criminal aliens subject to §
1226(c) are detained after release from criminal custody. This
means that those criminal aliens have been tried and punished for
commission of the predicate crimes enumerated in sections (A)(D) of § 1226(c)(1). Subjecting them to additional detention
because of the same predicate crimes for which they were
previously incarcerated can only be classified as punishment.
Historically, “[d]eportation is not a criminal proceeding and has
never been held to be punishment.” 173 No regulatory goals or
purposes can be articulated, addressed, or solved by further
detention of aliens who can assert good faith challenges to their
But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is
sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society.” Id. at 750-51.
171. Id. at 748.
172. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. “Under these circumstances, we cannot categorically
state that pretrial detention ‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’” Id. at 751.
173. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952).
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removal. In this context, mandatory detention without bond
becomes penal in nature and violative of the Fifth Amendment
Due Process protections afforded to all persons in the United
States. 174 As such, these aliens are entitled to have an opportunity
to establish that they are not subject to removal before being
subjected to mandatory detention without bond under § 1226(c).

VI. CONCLUSION
The infringement of due process interests of criminal aliens
subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1226(c) can be
minimized if criminal aliens are permitted to assert their good
faith challenges to removability during the Joseph hearing.
Currently, the scope of Joseph hearings only permits criminal
aliens to argue that they are not “properly included” within the
category of criminal aliens subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c). 175
The practical benefits associated with adopting a uniform
federal immigration policy regarding prolonged mandatory
detention of criminal aliens in limited situations where the alien
does not concede removal would be significant. 176 In addition to
being cost effective to release aliens who ultimately will not be
removed from the United States, it would address the lack of
available beds for thousands of aliens currently in detention, and

174. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 557-58 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“Heightened, substantive due process scrutiny . . . uncovers serious
infirmities in § 1226(c). Detention is not limited to dangerous criminal aliens or those found
likely to flee, but applies to all aliens claimed to be deportable for criminal convictions, even
where their underlying offenses are minor . . . .”).
175. For other proposals for modification to the mandatory detention framework, see
id. at 578-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (“The [bail] standards are more protective of a
detained alien’s liberty interests than those currently administered in the Immigration and
Nationalization Service’s Joseph hearings. And they have proved workable in practice in
the criminal justice system. Nothing in the statute forbids their use when § 1226(c)
deportability is in doubt . . . . So interpreted, the statute would require the Government to
permit a detained alien to seek an individualized assessment of flight risk and dangerousness
as long as the alien’s claim that he is not deportable is (1) not interposed solely for purposes
of delay and (2) raises a question of ‘law or fact’ that is not insubstantial. And that
interpretation, in my view, is consistent with what the Constitution demands.”).
176. See Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 3d 692, 709 n.25 (D.N.J. 2014) (“Lastly, I note
that Plaintiffs argue that mandatory detention is problematic because it may make it more
difficult for mandatorily detained aliens to secure legal representation in their removal
proceedings. In that connection, Plaintiffs cite a recent study showing both (i) the lack of
representation for mandatorily detained aliens, and (ii) a positive correlation between
representation and a favorable outcome for the alien in the removal proceedings.”).
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decrease the cost and manpower currently utilized to apprehend
criminal aliens.
The individualized benefits derived from modifications to
the mandatory detention policy would be especially important to
criminal aliens who are lawful permanent residents. If afforded
an individualized bond hearing, this group of criminal aliens
could avoid the consequences of prolonged periods of detention
and unnecessary disruption to their personal lives resulting from
futile periods of mandatory detention.
Additionally, modifications to the mandatory detention
policy will lead to the enforcement of § 1226(c) in a uniform
manner across all of the federal circuits. Currently, only criminal
aliens who are inside of the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit are
able to challenge the harsh consequences of §1226(c)’s
mandatory detention without bond. Inconsistent rulings for
similarly situated criminal aliens facing mandatory detention
without bond, where the only variable is the “accident of
geography” 177 between criminal aliens apprehended in and
outside of the Seventh Circuit, are contrary to the longstanding
principle that immigration laws must be enforced in a uniform
manner. The constitutional framers envisioned that immigration
laws would be enacted and enforced in a “uniform manner.”178
As immigration is solely within the purview of the federal
government, 179 inherent in the application and interpretation of
federal legislation is the premise that “federal statutes are
generally intended to have uniform nationwide application.” 180
177. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations omitted).
178. See generally The Federalist No. 32, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (referencing
the Congressional authority to establish “an Uniform Rule of Naturalization” was intended
to “necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a distinct rule,
there could be no Uniform Rule.” Hamilton’s analysis applies with equal force to the
necessity for uniformity within federal common law jurisprudence within the field of
immigration law.); see also Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1073 (N.D.
Ill. 2005) (“The uniformity requirement in immigration law is rooted textually in the
Constitution’s Naturalization Clause . . . .”).
179. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”).
180. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989); see
also Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1992) (In citing Holyfield, the Second Circuit
noted that “[t]he [Holyfield] Court first observed that because the Indian Child Welfare Act
was designed to implement a uniform federal policy—the same is true with the Immigration
and Nationality Act—domicile was not to be determined according to the law of the forum,
but rather required a uniform federal definition.”); Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d
905, 914 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have identified nothing in the legislative history to rebut the
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The commitment to uniform administration of a federal
immigration policy is recognized across federal jurisprudence.
The Third Circuit in Gerbier v. Holmes 181 noted that “[i]ndeed,
the policy favoring uniformity in the immigration context is
rooted in the Constitution.” 182 Judicial efforts to foster uniformity
within the field of immigration are founded upon notions of
fundamental fairness and a desire to avoid the consequences of
disparate treatment arising from jurisdictional variances. 183 For
example, the Third Circuit in Gerbier compared conflicting
classifications of the exact criminal activity by two different
states. Concerned about possible disparate treatment, the court
noted that “[t]his cannot be what Congress intended in
establishing a ‘uniform’ immigration law.” 184 Furthermore, the
Third Circuit, citing Francis v. INS, 185 added that “[f]undamental
fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like
circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated
in a like manner.” 186 Modification of Joseph hearings for criminal
aliens who do not concede that they are subject to removal would
address these concerns, and prevent the continuing infringement
of their substantive due process interests.

presumption that Congress intended uniform application of the immigration laws, and there
is evidence that Congress intended the interpretation that we adopt.”).
181. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2002).
182. Id. at 311.
183. See Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
The court considered the role that “the uniformity principle has played a central role in
immigration, including in construing and evaluating the validity of immigration statutes.”
Id. The Gerbier court recognized the nexus between uniformity and equity noting that
“[f]undamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like circumstances,
but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner.” Gerbier, 280 F.3d at
312.
184. Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 312.
185. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
186. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 2002). In addition to questions of
fundamental fairness, there are equal protection questions raised when federal statutes are
not uniformly enforced. See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975). Using the
analysis from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Francis court applied the rational
basis test and using the minimal scrutiny, the court noted that the application of a federal
statute “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Francis, 532 F.2d at 272. “We do not dispute
the power of Congress to create different standards of admission and deportation for different
groups of aliens. However, once those choices are made, individuals within a particular
group may not be subjected to disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any
legitimate governmental interest.” Id. at 273.

